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A VALIDATION OF A RE-EQUILIBRIUM DECISION
SUPPORT SYSTEM FOR PPP CONTRACTS
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A re-equilibrium model was developed which ensures that the rights of the Public
Private Partnership (PPP) project stakeholders are preserved during renegotiation and
minimizes the chances of disputes. The model develops the typical renegotiation
scenarios which include: increasing the service charges, increasing the concession
period, or paying a lump sum amount to the party of concern in order to maintain a
fixed rate of return and keep the return on equity constant. Moreover, a decision
support system was developed with the aid of Microsoft Excel 2013, Visual Basic for
Applications (VBA) programming language, and the Precision Tree 5.5 for Excel addin, in order to facilitate the process of selecting the optimum scenario which maximizes
the satisfaction of both parties (the private sector and the public sector). In this paper,
data is obtained from a case study of a wastewater treatment plant in Egypt, and
applied to the proposed model. The results obtained from the model are close to the
ones obtained from the Independent Financial Expert (IFE) of the wastewater treatment
plant project. This verifies and validates the objectives of the model.
Keywords: Renegotiation, Scenarios, Model, Microsoft Excel, VBA, Wastewater
treatment plant.
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PUBLIC PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS

A PPP is a mechanism which allows the private sector to engage in public infrastructure projects.

This can be done through different agreements. PPP agreements can include one or more of the
following components: Design, Build, Finance, Operate, Maintain, Own, Transfer, Lease,
Develop, Buy, and Refurbish. Figure 1 demonstrates the level of involvement of the private
sector along different combinations of the above PPP agreement components. The Private Sector
is more involved in Build Operate Own (BOO) agreements where the project ownership is
transferred to the private sector at the end of the project, (Broadbent and Laughlin, 2004). While
on the other hand, the level of the private sector involvement is minimal in case of operate
maintain (OM) agreements.
The importance of PPP agreements is that in many of their forms, the private sector becomes
the party which finances the PPP project. This allows governments to allocate the funds in their
treasuries to other important infrastructure projects and enhance economic growth, (The
Construction Management Association of America 2012). Also, the private sector is proven to
provide a better value for money (VFM) when achieved properly. This is achieved by providing
a balanced allocation of risks and opportunities, (Guan-Wei 2010).
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Figure 1. Private sector involvement (Kwak et al. 2009).
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PROBLEM DEFINITION

Despite the above benefits of PPP, contract renegotiation is inevitable in many of the PPP
Contracts. Due to the long-term nature of PPP contracts, which usually lasts for decades and in
some countries for almost a century, conditions change over time. Assumptions, made at the
beginning of the project, become no longer feasible and require alteration and adaptation to the
new circumstances. Furthermore, different sets of rules and situations arise which require
changes to the original contract. Hence, re-equilibrium of the original contract is required.
3

OBJECTIVE

An ongoing research effort has been conducted to develop a model which produces the reequilibrium scenarios for the purpose of renegotiating of PPP contracts. The model was
developed with the aid of Microsoft Excel 2013, VBA programming language, and the Precision
Tree 5.5 for Excel add-in. The aim of this paper is to validate and verify the outputs of the
previously mentioned model by applying the mechanism to data obtained from a real-life project
located in Egypt. Results obtained from the model are to be compared to the ones developed by
the IFE which is a third party who is responsible for any alteration to the Contract financial
model.
4

CONTRACT RENEGOTIATION

When an event that was not previously anticipated arises, renegotiation has to take place. At this
stage, the comprehensiveness of the PPP contract is tested. Renegotiation usually results in one
of the outcomes stated in Table 1.
In his paper entitled “The Dark and Bright Sides of Renegotiation”, De Brux has proven that
the longer the duration of the project, the more complex the renegotiation process, (De Brux
2010). On the other hand, Kumaraswamy et al claims that the more flexible the PPP contract, the
more sustainable the PPP project, (Kumaraswamy et al. 2005). Finally, Garvin stressed the
importance of mutual trust between the PPP parties and the sharing of risks and benefits which
minimize disputes during the renegotiation stage (Garvin 2009).
5

A DECISION SUPPORT SYSTEM

As seen in the previous section, the contract flexibility and the mutual trust between the PPP
parties are two important factors in the renegotiation process. The model to be verified is in the
format of a decision support system which guides all parties in order to facilitate and increase the
flexibility and the satisfaction of all the parties in a PPP project.
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The model consists of a five-stage framework. The components of the framework are: the
user-interface, risk allocation, PPP valuation, and financial model re-equilibrium and scenario
development.
Table 1. Renegotiation Outcomes (Guasch et al. 2007).
Renegotiation Outcome
Delays on investment obligations targets
Acceleration of investment obligations

%Renegotiated
Contracts
69%
18%

Tariff Increases
Tariff Decreases

62%
19%

Extension in the Concession Period
Increase Annual fees paid by the Operator
Decrease Annual fees paid by the Operator

59%
17%
31%

The user interface stage aims to collect all the inputs to the model, including: the risk
allocation matrix information, the original financial model of the project, the different interests
and concerns of the parties involved and the events that occurred to disturb the project
equilibrium. The risk allocation stage processes all the inputs to form the risk allocation matrix.
The matrix does not only contain the risk allocation information, but also defines the impact
estimated. The impact can be totally allocated to a certain party or shared among the parties with
a certain breakdown allocated to each.
The PPP valuation stage aims to fully input the base financial model of the contract which
shall be the base for any later change. In PPP contracts, the private sector is required to develop a
comprehensive financial model which includes all the expenditures, direct and indirect costs,
revenues, debt information, etc. The financial model re-equilibrium stage aims to use the base
financial model in order to come up with a new model which incorporates all the changes and
events which led to the disturbance of the original contract equilibrium.
Finally, the scenario development stage bridges the gap between the base financial model and
the newly formed model in order to come up with different scenarios to suggest during the
renegotiation stage in order to minimize disputes and increase all parties’ satisfaction. The
outputs of the model are the re-equilibrium scenarios which are: increasing the service charges,
increasing the concession period, or paying a lump sum amount to the party of concern. The only
constraint of the model is to keep the internal rate of return (IRR) of the private sector constant
where the IRR is the measure of the profitability of the private sector which needs to remain
constant.
6

CASE STUDY

In order to validate the above model, a case study of a wastewater treatment plant in Cairo is
used. The PPP mechanism of the project is design, build, finance, operate, maintain, renew and
transfer (DBFOMRT) contract. This is a suitable project to use since it has many of the PPP
forms within its contract. The project duration is 20 years where two years are allocated to the
construction of the project and the rest is for the operation period. The project consists of a
wastewater treatment plant with a capacity of 250,000 cubic meters of treated domestic
wastewater per day. The government is to pay the private sector an annual fee known in the PPP
contract as “availability payment” against the service provided. The location of the wastewater
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treatment plant, the private sector special purpose vehicle (SPV) name, the technical consultants’
and financial advisors’ names are not disclosed for confidentiality purposes.
In Egypt, all PPP projects are administrated by the PPP Central Unit which is part of the
Ministry of Finance. Although the owner of the wastewater treatment project is the Ministry of
Housing, Utilities and Urban Development (MHUUD), the tender is issued and administered by
the New Urban Communities Authorities (NUCA) and the PPP Central Unit. This format
changes depending on many factors. For example, depending on the nature of the project, the
owner changes to be the line ministry of concern. Moreover, in many countries, each ministry
has its own PPP unit rather than having a single central PPP unit.
Beside the public sector and the private sector, the contract stipulated that a third party exists
which is called the IFE. The duty of the IFE is to review the base financial model to ensure its
integrity and correctness. In addition, the IFE is the party responsible for any modifications that
occur to the original financial model. In other words, it is the party which develops the reequilibrium scenarios.
The project contract stipulates that the IFE is to calculate the re-equilibrium value in a way
which always ensures that the internal rate of return of the private sector remains constant. In
case of a dispute, the IFE shall hand the issue to the Partnership Committee. According to the
project contract, the Partnership Committee consists of five representatives, each belonging to:
the New Urban Communities Authority (NUCA), the Construction Authority for Portable Water
and Wastewater, the Ministry of Housing, Utilities, and Urban Development (MHUUD), the PPP
Central Unit, and the Egyptian Water, Wastewater Regulatory, and Customer Protection
Authority (EWRA). To ensure the fairness of the process, another five representatives are
assigned from the private sector consortium.
In order to avoid disputes and minimize the need for the IFE and the Partnership Committee
and at the same time, enhance robust and transparent re-equilibrium mechanism, the framework
proposed is to be validated to ensure that the formulated re-equilibrium scenarios are to achieve
the contract requirements of maintaining the private sector internal rate of return constant. This
enhances the mutual trust between the project parties as the automated process eliminates bias.
7

VALIDATION OF THE FRAMEWORK

In the above case study, a call for contract renegotiation was raised. The first stage in the
framework is the user interface. Inputs required at this stage are: project general information such
as project name, contract type, project payment mechanism, payment amount, and payment
intervals. As stated above the contract type is DBFOMRT. The payment mechanism is
availability payment against the service existence as per the contract specifications. The payment
amount is 32 Million Egyptian Pounds paid quarterly for a concession period of 20 years.
The risk allocation matrix was formulated using the contract information. The risk matrix
includes the risk description, and allocation and the impact sharing mechanism assigned to each
party and the sharing percentage. The risks are categorized into three main categories which are:
country-related, sector-related and project-related.
The PPP Valuation stage contains main financial data of the project, the base financial model
with their cashflow distribution along the project life-time. The project cashflow components are
Capital Fund, Operation Income, Government Subsidy, Loan Principle, Loan Interest, Operation
Cost, and Taxes. The model summarizes the financial model submitted to the government to the
categories shown in Figure 2 in order to calculate the internal rate of return (IRR). The discount
rate is the rate at which the cash flows are to be discounted to obtain the concession value at the
project base date. The discount rate is calculated through the bank risk free rate and the producer
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price index (PPI) to account for the effect of inflation, and it is fixed to equal 108 percent as per
the case study contract.

Figure 2. Payment distribution.

The Financial Model Re-equilibrium stage is the stage where the user enters the events which
led to the contract renegotiation. In this case study the events were delays in the operation start
date, a delay by the New Urban Communities Authority (NUCA) to deliver the influent water
(the wastewater to be treated by the plant), and a delay by NUCA to provide the effluent pumping
station. The impacts of the events were calculated according to the risk allocation matrix and the
base financial model was edited to account for the effect of those events/risks.
The scenario development stage is based on the data obtained in the previous two stages
where the project base and modified cashflows are discounted using the above discount rate,
which is usually fixed in the contract agreement at an earlier stage, in order to obtain the reequilibrium amount which is the difference between the net present value of the base and the
modified project cashflows.
In the scenario development stage, the re-equilibrium payment is then used in order to
develop the different project scenarios using the same discounting factor. The four re-equilibrium
scenarios obtained are shown in Figure 3. The scenarios are calculated by transferring the reequilibrium amount calculated above to the different payment options and extension of time via
the time value for money equations.

Figure 3. Re-equilibrium scenarios.

The results obtained from the model is compared to the IFE conclusions and are shown in
Table 2. As shown in the table, the percentage variance between the model results and the IFE
conclusions varied between zero to almost five percent which is acceptable.
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Table 2. Results variance from the real-life case study.
Scenarios
Scenario 1
Scenario 2
Scenario 3
Scenario 4
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Model Value
270.34
40.36
N/A
34.5
30

Units
M EGP
M EGP/Quarter
Years
M EGP/Quarter
Years

%Variance from IFE
3.1%
0.4%
N/A
4.8%
0%

CONCLUSION

The validation technique used in this paper is to compare the model results to a real-life case
study and observe the deviation or the variance between the calculated results and the actual
results obtained from the IFE. The limitation of the research is to use a constant IRR for the
private sector when returning the re-equilibrium to the PPP project.
In conclusion, the results obtained from the Decision Support System prototype model were
reasonably close to the ones obtained from the IFE of the Egyptian wastewater treatment plant.
The percentage variance between the model calculated scenarios and the IFE obtained scenarios
varied from almost zero percent in scenario two, which is adjusting the service charges, to a value
not exceeding five percent in the other two. This confirms the function ability of the model
developed in this research.
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